Here’s an open-ended question regarding social research and the researchers’ reluctance to firmly resort to theoretical strategies beyond merely empirical ones.
McGrath states that social psychology research has had a limitation in its history—it hasn’t given full consideration to theoretical bases. Also, most of empirical research we read nowadays uses certain empirical methods without a particular guideline as to which to select and without any generic reference to theoretical strategies (formal methods).
The question that arises naturally seems dichotomous: Is such reluctance a result of the lack of substantial knowledge and/or expertise among social scientists, or is it because formal methods are too abstract to apply on or devise from human systems, including the CSCW context of such systems?
I believe that formal methods, while not generally sufficient on their own account, are fullynecessary for social and empirical research. Your thoughts…?
McGrath’s classical treatment of the social research process elicits several intrinsic facts about conducting empirical research, such as the individual strengths and drawbacks of each available/new method, or the collective strength of at least two methods employed conjunctively to tackle some research question.
It is important, however, to distinguish that empirical methods in software engineering and the social sciences that deal with human systems, for that matter, are susceptible to converging towards dismality unless at least one formal method (theoretical strategy) is also employed. McGrath alludes to a similar perspective on p. 159, wherein he argues that the methods of Quadrant IV are crucial for philosophical reasons (“research is scientific”) and empirical ones (“theories are built from such observations”). It is a relief to read such an affirmation because, in turn, it does affirm the fact that science is only meritocratic in its entirety. This view becomes a little too misty when jumping to social science research, wherein conclusions along different studies using different methods for the same problem may not consistently converge.
If the overall objective of social research is to elicit truths about human systems, then Russell’s “recommandation for future generations” resonates in my mind: “If something is true, you should believe, otherwise you shouldn’t. If you can’t find out its truth, you should suspend judgment.” Can social researchers afford to suspend judgment when the methods they have employed have yielded inconsistent results or conclusions for whatever problem they’ve tackled?
(One note of correction, given that we’re philosophizing on science: When describing what computer simulations are on p. 159, McGrath mentions that the designed model is “complete and logically closed.” Such a model, alas, cannot exist because co-existence of completeness and consistency is precluded by Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems…)
